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While Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) refer to specific experiences shared by all
subjects who have AVH—the perception of auditory speech without corresponding
external stimuli, the characteristics of these experiences differ from one subject
to another. These characteristics include aspects such as the location of AVH
(inside or outside the head), the linguistic complexity of AVH (hearing words,
sentences, or conversations), the range of content of AVH (repetitive or systematized
content), and many other variables. In another word, AVH are phenomenologically
heterogeneous experiences. After decades of research focused on a few explanatory
mechanisms for AVH, it is apparent that none of these mechanisms alone explains
the wide phenomenological range of AVH experiences. To date, our phenomenological
understanding of AVH remains largely disjointed from our understanding of the
mechanisms of AVH. For a cohesive understanding of AVH, I review the phenomenology
and the cognitive and neural basis of AVH. This review indicates that the phenomenology
of AVH is not a pointless curiosity. How a subject describes his AVH experiences
could inform about the neural events that resulted in AVH. I suggest that a
subject-specific combinatoric associations of different neural events result in AVH
experiences phenomenologically diverse across subjects.
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Decades of neuroscience research demonstrate that mental dis-
orders are heterogeneous at the levels of neural circuits and genes
(Insel, 2009), and that any specific defective neural circuit and any
specific gene exists across diagnostic categories (Cross-Disorder
Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium et al., 2013). One
could think that individual mental experiences/symptoms such as
Auditory Verbal hallucinations (AVH) could offer better chance
than mental disorders for corresponding to a neural specificity.
However, like mental disorders, AVH are heterogeneous.
AVH are encountered in multiple psychiatric and neurological
diseases and in non-clinical populations and are phenomeno-
logically diverse. While all subjects with AVH necessarily share
a common experience [the perception of speech in the auditory
modality without corresponding external stimuli (Stephane et al.,
2001a)], they differ from each other with respect to the character-
istics of these experiences. For example, some subjects experience
AVH inside their heads while others experience them outside their
heads, and some subjects experience AVH with limited repetitive
content while others experience AVH with variable rich content.
A careful examination of these characteristics indicates that at
least some of them correspond to neural specificities.
For years, research of AVHmechanisms has been largely based
on the hypothesis that AVH result from a unitary deficit. However,
emerging evidence suggest that a single deficit model does not
explain the phenomenology of AVH and that multiple deficits are
needed to adequately account for AVH experiences (Larøi and
Woodward, 2007; Jones, 2010). To date, there are multiple mod-
els for the mechanisms of AVH; however, many of the existing
models remain largely disjointed from AVH phenomenology and
as such our understanding of AVH remains limited (Laroi et al.,
2010).
For a cohesive phenomenological-neural understanding of
AVH, here, I review the literature from the patient experience
(phenomenology) to the brain (cognitive and neural basis). Based
on current phenomenological and neural knowledge of AVH, I
suggest an integrated phenomenological-neural framework.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF AVH
Phenomenology as a philosophical discipline is a method for
the study of first person (subjective) experiences for the pur-
pose of identifying invariant inter-subjective (shared) phenomena
“essences” (Zahavi, 2003). In a later development of philosoph-
ical phenomenology, heterophenomenology (Dennett, 1991), it
was pointed out that shared first person subjective experiences are
not infallible. It is commonplace for people, in certain situations,
to experience movement and to see lines and color changes in
the absence of movement, lines, or changing colors, respectively.
In the tradition of heterophenomenology, first person subjective
experiences are valid only as far as they are validated by natural
science methodologies. Phenomenological research of AVH has
proven to be in the latter tradition.
Phenomenological research of AVH shows that while all sub-
jects with AVH share a common experience—hearing auditory
speech without corresponding external stimuli, they differ from
each other with respect to a number of characteristics of this
common experience. For example, AVH differ across-subject in
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respect to space location (inside or outside the head), clarity
(similarity to external speech or verbal thoughts), content (sys-
tematized or repetitive; new or previously experienced), linguistic
complexity (hearing individual words, individual sentences, or
conversations), concomitancy to normal external speech (hear-
ing voices when alone in silence or while talking to other people),
insight, or nosognosia [defined as awareness or not of the per-
ceptions/object dissociation (Copolov et al., 2004)], gender (male
or female voices), familiarity (familiar or unfamiliar voices), fre-
quency, and loudness, and a number of other characteristics
(Claude and Ey, 1932a,b; Jaspers, 1959; Sedman, 1966; Nayani
and David, 1996; Stephane et al., 2003). In another word, AVH
are phenomenologically heterogeneous experiences, which is to
be distinguished from the heterphenomenological philosophical
approachmentioned above (AVH phenomenological heterogene-
ity refers to experiences of AVH that differ across subject while
philosophical heterophenomenology refers to the possibility of
having erroneous first person subjective experiences and the need
for validation of these experiences by natural science methods).
Phenomenological research of AVH has not been about mar-
veling about the curiosity of AVH characteristics but, rather
about the implications of these characteristics. For over a cen-
tury, psychiatrists, psychologists, and philosophers considered
that phenomenological variables point to qualitative (categorical)
differences in hallucinatory experiences—that is, for example,
AVH associated with AVH-anosognosia are qualitatively different
from AVH with preserved nosognosia. As any given phenomeno-
logical variable is invariant only in a subset of subjects with
AVH, they divided AVH, although inconsistently, into multiple
sub-categories. For example, Claude and Ey (1932b) identified a
“hallucinosis” subgroup when insight was present and a pseudo-
hallucinations subgroup when the content was repetitive “etats
obssessionels parasites” (Claude and Ey, 1932a). Jaspers, on the
other hand used the term pseudohallucinations to refer to AVH
that are concomitant to normal external stimuli, located in inner
space, and lacked clarity of external perceptions (Jaspers, 1959).
While Sedman considered pseudohallucinations to reflect AVH
when insight into the unreality of the perception was present (lack
of AVH-anosognosia) (Sedman, 1966). Jaspers also identified
“sense-memory” subgroup when the content of AVH was previ-
ously experienced (Jaspers, 1959), a phenomenon also referred to
as experiential hallucinations. Studies also examined AVH phe-
nomenology for cues to discriminate between different categories
of mental illness, and found that some AVH phenomenological
variables differentiate between psychotic illnesses categories in
use in that era (Lowe, 1973).
The above sub-categorization of AVH was considered as a pre-
mature closer; (Dening and Berrios, 1996) and, indeed, none of
the above categories of AVH, beside experiential hallucinations,
which could be produced by stimulation of the superior temporal
gyrus (Penfield and Perot, 1963), were validated by neuroscience
methods.
Motivated by numerous indirect evidence that the phe-
nomenological variables of AVH reflect specific neural dysfunc-
tions (see next section), our research group carried out a study
to investigate the phenomenological space of AVH as a means to
investigate the neural circuitry of AVH (Stephane et al., 2003).
We used multidimensional scaling, a method that create an
n-dimension maps based on distance or similarity data (here,
the jacquard coefficient, which is the ratio of co-occurrence of
two phenomenological variables to the sum of the occurrence of
either), and found a three-dimension solution, linguistic com-
plexity (hearing words, hearing sentences, hearing conversations),
inner space-outer space locations, and self-other attribution of
AVH. Based on evidence that language levels (lexical, sentence,
discourse) are related to specialized neural resources (Caplan,
1992), that the neural correlates for sounds perceived in inner
space differ from the neural correlates of sounds perceived in
outer space (Hunter et al., 2003), and that of neural mecha-
nisms for agency (self or other) (Feinberg, 1978), we suggested
that the above dimensional structure mirrors the neural dys-
functions that result in AVH, such that AVH consisting of single
words, sentences, or conversations result from dysfunction in
lexical, sentence, and discourse neural resources, respectively.
Similar arguments are made with respect to AVH experienced
inside/outside the head and attributed to other/self in relation
to neural resources for sound localization, and self-other distinc-
tion. Recently McCarthy-Jones et al. (2012) carried out cluster
analysis using a wider subset of phenomenological variables than
the one used in our previous study (Stephane et al., 2003) and
found four clusters with main features that include repetitive con-
tent and running commentary, memory-like, replay of memories
and nonverbal hallucinations. Both studies illustrate the useful
information that could be derived from AVH phenomenology.
Furthermore, AVH phenomenology does not only provide a
basis for the identification of categories of AVH that could be
validated from neuroscience standpoint, it could also inform the
experimental design in AVH research, (Larøi and Woodward,
2007; Laroi et al., 2010) an approach that has been proven fruitful
(see last section).
The potential relevance of AVH phenomenology to the neural
basis and treatment of AVH lead to another line of phenomeno-
logical research, the evaluation of the reliability of the patient
report about hallucinations characteristics. Three decades ago,
Junginger and Frame (1985) examined how consistent patients
were in their report about a small subset of the phenomeno-
logical variables of AVH (such as frequency, loudness, location,
and clarity). They asked patients to rate these variables on ana-
log scales. Each variable was rated twice with question differently
worded, and the consistency between the ensemble of questions
pairs was computed. In our group, we undertook two approaches
to examine the reliability of the report about AVH, the consis-
tency of report and the frequency of endorsement of items. Both
approaches are implemented in the computerized binary Scale
of Auditory Speech Hallucinations (cbSASH) (Stephane et al.,
2006a) The consistency approach is similar to that of Junginger
and Frame however it examines the mismatches of binary vari-
ables of AVH. The frequency approach is based on standard
techniques for detection of deception, where the endorsement
of high numbers of infrequently endorsed statements indicates
deception (Butcher et al., 1989).
The above considerations indicate that AVH phenomenology
might not be an arbitrary collection of patients’ first person
subjective experiences; phenomenological research indicates the
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neural basis of AVH could be phenomenology-dependent. While
indirect evidence in support of this thesis could be found in the
literature for decades, it is not until recently that direct evidence
of neural basis for AVH phenomenology was demonstrated.
THE NEURAL BASIS OF AVH PHENOMENOLOGY
INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE NEURAL BASIS OF AVH
PHENOMENOLOGY
The literature provides multiple indirect evidence of a neu-
ral basis for a number of phenomenological variables of AVH,
including: AVH-anosognosia (unawareness of the perception-
object dissociation), content (systematized or repetitive), space
location (inner or outer space), and familiarity and the gen-
der of the “voices.” Anosognosia of neurological symptoms (e.g.,
cortical blindness, and left side hemiparesis) is associated with
symptom-specific neural correlates—lesions of the visual asso-
ciative cortex (Magitot and Hartmann, 1926) or frontal lobes
(McDaniel and McDaniel, 1991) in the case of cortical blind-
ness, and lesions in the non-dominant motor cortex in the case
of left side hemiplegia (Babinski, 1914). As AVH in the clinical
population are symptoms of brain disease just like blindness or
hemiplegia, AVH-anosognosia could be associated with specific
neural substrates (Stephane et al., 2003).
It has also been shown that the neural correlates for speech
perception differ according to whether the verbal stimuli are
repetitive or variable (Cottraux et al., 1996), whether they are
perceived to be inside or outside the head (Hunter et al., 2003),
according to the familiarity of the speech sounds (Nakamura
et al., 2001), and according to the gender of the perceived
speech (Sokhi et al., 2005). While the difference in neural cir-
cuitry between the perception of actual feminine and masculine
voices (for example) could result from different factors associ-
ated with these perceptions, it is plausible that similar differ-
ences in neural circuitry exist with the perception of halluci-
nated feminine and masculine voices. Consequently, it could be
argued that the neural basis of AVH differs according to the
content (repetitive or systematized), space location (inside or
outside the head), and the gender and familiarity of perceived
voices.
DIRECT EVIDENCE OF NEURAL BASIS OF AVH PHENOMENOLOGY
Recently, numerous studies have investigated the neural corre-
lates associated with a number of the phenomenological vari-
ables of AVH and confirmed that the neural correlates of AVH
are phenomenology-dependent (with respect to the investigated
variables). One study has shown that, in patients with AVH,
abnormalities in the right temporoparietal junction, a key area
in the “where” auditory system, depend on the spatial location
of the experience of AVH (inner or outer space) (Plaze et al.,
2011). In another study, the loudness of AVH was associated
with decreased activity in the bilateral angular gyrus, anterior
cingulated gyrus, left inferior frontal gyri, and left temporal cor-
tex (Vercammen et al., 2010). Furthermore, one fMRI study
has shown that the acoustic clarity of AVH (similarity of AVH
to speech or to thoughts), which was referred to as “sense of
reality” in the study at hand, was associated with reduced lan-
guage lateralization (Vercammen et al., 2010). However, another
methodologically different fMRI study has shown that acoustic
clarity was associated with activity in the inferior frontal gyri (Raij
et al., 2009). The different findings could be related to differences
in the methodology between the two studies (for example, in the
first study, subjects were scanned while they performed a metri-
cal stress evaluation task to activate inner speech, in the second
study, patients were scanned during hallucinations). Therefore,
while the exact neural correlates of the acoustic clarity of hallu-
cinations remain unknown, these two studies provide evidence
of a neural basis of acoustic clarity of AVH. Additionally, in drug
naïve patients experiencing high linguistic complexity AVH (con-
versations), an FDG PET study showed higher metabolic rates in
the left superior and middle temporal cortices, bilateral superior
medial frontal cortex relative to psychotic patients without AVH
(Horga et al., 2011). Furthermore, patients with AVH, compared
to healthy controls, showed different patterns of speech related
activation depending on the familiarity of speech (Zhang et al.,
2008). While this does not indicate that patients with AVH con-
sisting of familiar “voices” are different from patient with AVH
consisting of unfamiliar voices, it emphasizes that dysfunction of
neural processes for speech familiarity might play a role in the
pathogenesis of AVH. Furthermore, preliminary evidence indi-
cates that AVH with repetitive content respond to treatment by
an antiobsessionalagent (Stephane et al., 2001b).
The studies outlined above, therefore, bring third person
(objective) validation to the patients’ first person subjective expe-
riences of AVH. Whether such validation would extend to the
other phenomenological variables is possible but remains to be
proven.
COGNITIVE MODELS OF BRAIN ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED
WITH AVH
Three categories of cognitive models could be identified, includ-
ing: inner speech, bottom-up and top-down processing of percep-
tions, and intrusions of thoughts and memories.
INNER SPEECH
Inner speech was a natural place to start in AVH research as this
type of hallucinations refers to the perception of speech. In the
mid twentieth century, based on observations that AVH are asso-
ciated with lip movements without audible speech (Forrer, 1960),
subvocal speech (SVS) that could be amplified and recorded
(Gould, 1950), and Electromyographic speech muscle activity
(Roberts et al., 1952), it was suggested that hallucinating patients
are virtually hearing their self-generated faint SVS (Gould, 1948,
1950). This theory was short lived since maneuvers blocking
SVS did not alleviate AVH (Stephane et al., 2001a). Given that
both inner speech and AVH are associated with both motor and
perceptual components (Sokolov, 1972; MacKay, 1992), We sug-
gested, instead, that a disorder of generation of inner speech
would result in a perceptual component (AVH) and a motor com-
ponent (SVS) as an un-bothersome byproduct (Stephane et al.,
2001a).
The vast majority of studies on this line of research focused
on explaining the attribution to other of a self-generated inner
speech. In the literature, inner speech theory is sometimes
equated with a particular model (the forward model) (Frith
and Done, 1988); here I discuss the ensemble of models that
implicated inner speech in the pathogenesis of AVH.
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The corollary discharge deficit or forward model is one of the
most widely studied models of AVH mechanisms, and received
empirical support from many studies (Ford et al., 2001; Stephane
et al., 2006b). It was based on Feinberg theory that, “motor
commands in the nervous system are associated with neuronal dis-
charges that alter activity in both sensory and motor pathways.
They may act to inform sensory systems that the stimulation pro-
duced by movement is self-generated rather than environmentally
produced. In this way these discharges are, at least in an abstract
sense, crucial for the distinction of self and non-self and that
could apply to higher functions” (Feinberg, 1978). The forward
model postulates that a disconnection between speech gener-
ation and speech perception results in a failure to compute
the expected sensory experience of self-generated inner speech,
and would lead to experiencing self-generated inner speech as
alien.
Another model for self-other misattribution is that of altered
preconscious planning of discourse, where a speaker generates a
discourse that is incongruent with the goals or intentions of the
speaker (Hoffman, 1986). While unintended tick (for example)
is not attributed to other, Hoffman considered that the com-
plexity of unintended inner speech, relative to unintended motor
tick, suffices for the other-misattribution of the former (Hoffman,
1991).
Bentall (1990) argued that cognitive deficits such as the above
do not explain the cultural, historical and emotional aspects of
hallucinations “hallucinators don’t hallucinate random events,” he
suggested that self-other misattribution (defective reality moni-
toring) could result from a variety of deficits in metacognition
(knowing that we know) as conceptualized by the American
psychologist John H. Flavell (1979).
Fernyhough (2004), motivated by the infinite regress objec-
tion to the above theories, brilliantly examined the work of
Vygotsky on inner speech development (Vygotsky, 1978) for clues
about self-other misattribution. He suggested that alteration of
the transformation that social speech undergoes to become inner
speech (disruption of the internalization or re-expansion) could
result in inner speech attributed to other (AVH), as inner speech
is dialogical by nature.
Finally, in an imaging study carried out by our group
(Stephane et al., 2006b), right handed hallucinating schizophre-
nia patient (but not matched non-hallucinating schizophrenia
patients and healthy controls), showed abnormal laterality of the
Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) activation during a speech
generation task. As the SMA has been implicated in attributing
self-generated actions to self, we suggested that the abnormal
laterality of the SMA during the action of inner speech gener-
ation could result in occasional failure in attributing to self a
self-generated speech (just like a right handed individual could
fail carrying out actions with his/her left hand).
Unlike AVH, which could be experienced in outer space, inner
speech is experienced in inner space. However, this apparent dis-
order in the spatial localization of inner speech received much
less attention than self-other misattribution of inner speech.
Nonetheless, The literature shows that three studies have exam-
ined this aspect of inner speech and all reported tendency of
schizophrenia patients to confuse speech experienced in inner
space with speech experienced in outer space (Harvey, 1985;
Franck et al., 2000; Badcock, 2010; Stephane et al., 2010a).
BOTTOM UP AND TOP DOWNMODELS
That perceptions depend on both external sensory stimuli and
on representation of past perceptual experiences is an age-old
idea. For example, Taylor (1979) observes that, in dim light-
ing, a rhomboid table could be perceived as rectangular table.
Another example is that misspelled words in a text are often cor-
rectly read without noticing misspelling (Jaspers, 1959). Current
AVH research implicates both the sensory pathway (bottom up)
and past perceptual experiences and expectation (top down) in
hallucinations pathogenesis.
Bottom-up factors point to unconstrained activity in the sen-
sory and perceptual brain resources due to scarce external sen-
sory stimuli. Auditory hallucinations have been often reported
in patients with acquired deafness (Thewissen et al., 2005),
in survivors of long solitary ordeals (Logan, 1993), and, to a
lesser extent, during sensory deprivation experiments (Slade and
Bentall, 1988). Furthermore, in psychotic patients, a dramatic
social withdrawal preceding the onset of hallucinations has been
reported (Hoffman, 2008).
Top down role in the pathogenesis of hallucinations has been
also proposed for about half a century. French philosopher,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considered hallucinations to reflect the
“intentionality” of the hallucinator who creates a world accord-
ing to his intentions and expectations (Merleau-Ponty, 2002),
and Italian psychiatrist Silvano Arieti considered hallucinations
to result from moments of heightened auditory attention “listen-
ing attitude” (Arieti, 1974). Recent studies bring support to these
perspectives. Hallucinations scores were correlated with imagery-
perception facilitation with pure tones (Aleman et al., 2003), and
with the effect of semantic expectation on the perception of sen-
tences (Vercammen and Aleman, 2010). Furthermore, increased
incidence of auditory hallucinations is reported with high audi-
tory attentional demands in healthy populations (Baraldi Knobel
and Ganz Sanchez, 2009). It was suggested that an imbalance
between top-down and bottom-up processing of stimuli could
result in erroneous percepts that, when repetitive, would train the
network to perceive hallucinations (Aleman et al., 2003). It was
also suggested that a cognitive control deficit results in a failure of
top-down inhibition of bottom-up erroneous percept (Hugdahl
et al., 2009).
INTRUSIONS OF THOUGHTS AND MEMORIES
Many studies in the past decade implicated intrusions of mem-
ories and thoughts in the pathogenesis of hallucinations. Based
on findings indicating deficits in intentional inhibition in hallu-
cinating patients, it was suggested that failure of suppression of
irrelevant memories and other mental associations could result
in intrusive memories experienced as hallucinations (Badcock
et al., 2005; Waters et al., 2006). The theory finds support
in many studies showing intrusions errors and false recogni-
tion with free recall and Sternberg paradigms (Brébion et al.,
2007; Brebion et al., 2010), and that ruminations were related
to hallucinations indirectly through the mediating factor intru-
sive thoughts (Jones and Fernyhough, 2009). Additionally, two
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fMRI studies showing deactivation of the parahippocampal gyrus
prior to hallucinations (Hoffman et al., 2008; Diederen et al.,
2010), and onemagentoencephalography (MEG) study a decrease
in theta-band power in the right hippocampus at the onset of
AVH (van Lutterveld et al., 2012) bring further support to this
theory. Studies also implicated intrusive thoughts in hallucina-
tions through association with cognitive dissonance, the evidence,
however, is not conclusive (van de Ven, 2012).
OTHER ASPECT OF BRAIN ACTIVITY ASSOCIATEDWITH AVH
Some basic aspects of brain function affect all cognitive oper-
ations. These include, laterality, connectivity and the default
modes system; all of which were implicated with AVH and
schizophrenia in general. For example, studies have shown lack
of right ear advantage in dichotic listening task (Hugdahl, 2009),
and abnormal SMA laterality with a speech generation task in hal-
lucinating schizophrenia patients (Stephane et al., 2006b). The
above-mentioned forward model is a special case of dysconnec-
tivity. Moreover, evidence of dysconncectivity implicates many
other systems such as dorsolaterofrontal/superior temporal gyrus
(Lawrie et al., 2002) and between the anterior cingulated gyrus
and superior temporal gyrus (Mechelli et al., 2007), as well as
dysconnectivity within the default mode network (van de Ven,
2012).
MATCHES ANDMISMATCHES BETWEEN AVH
PHENOMENOLOGY AND AVH MODELS
Here we take a close look on how the abovemodels for AVH could
explain some phenomenological variables but fail to explain oth-
ers. This look is theoretical and based on current knowledge of
AVH phenomenology and models. Direct empirical support is
lacking as research designs did not generally take in considera-
tion AVH phenomenology. It should be also mentioned that an
exhaustive look on matches and mismatches may not serve much
purpose and the account below is meant to be illustrative.
First, while any of the models of self-other misattribution
could explain AVH attributed to other, they don’t explain AVH
attributed to self as encountered sometimes in schizophrenia
(Stephane et al., 2003) and in survivors of long solitary ordeals
who at some point during the ordeal undergo a transition from
talking to themselves to experiencing their own voice as coming
from outside (Logan, 1993). Furthermore, each of the self-other
misattribution models may explain the self-other misattribu-
tion in certain phenomenological categories of AVH but not in
others. For example, the forward model, presumes one speaker
only “the hallucinator.” Therefore, it would account for self-
other misattribution in AVH consisting of one, but not multiple
“voices.” Altered discourse planning could produce unintended
words and/or sentences (verbal messages) that result in a frag-
mented discourse. This model presumes that the unintended
verbal messages are experienced as hallucinations and as such
this model would explain self-other misattribution when AVH
consist of words and sentences but not conversations. Finally
Fernyhough’s model presumes internal dialog between the hal-
lucinator and other(s). Therefore, it could account for self-other
misattribution when AVH consist of one or more “voices,” but
not when AVH consist of multiple “voices” talking to each other.
These arguments favor the visionary suggestion of Bentall, that
self-other misattribution could result from a number of differ-
ent deficits in the metacognitive domain “It should be noted that
many different types of cues are likely to be important in real-
ity discrimination and that many different traits and deficits are
therefore likely to be associated with hallucinatory experiences. The
failure of reality discrimination in hallucinating patients might
therefore be considered a final common pathway underlying their
experiences, rather than the ultimate cause of their hallucinations.
Moreover, it is probable that different kinds of cognitive deficits
will be associated with different types of hallucinations” (Bentall,
1990).
Additionally, asmany times pointed out (Badcock, 2010; Jones,
2010; Laroi et al., 2010) self-other misattribution models do not
account for aspect of AVH such as why AVH are repetitive in some
and systematized in others, or why some subjects are aware of
the lack of object for AVH while others are not (anosognosia).
AVH “are more than just words; it involves the perception of infor-
mation about speaker identity and vocal affect. . . ,” Badcock notes
(Badcock, 2010).
Similar reasoning could apply to Bottom up/top down and
intrusions models. For example, heightened semantic expecta-
tion and listening attitude (top down) model could explain AVH
consisting of words or sentences, but not conversations. Intrusive
memories and intrusive thoughts could account for AVH with
certain characteristics but not with others. Intrusions usually
refer to singular events (the event, here, being a hallucination).
When the hallucinations are repetitive words or sentences, it
could be easily conceived that the hallucinations result from
intrusions. However, when the hallucinations consist of complex
multi-element auditory objects such as familiar voices issuing
tirades of abuse untypical of the speaker (to whom the voices are
attributed), or conversations with variable rich content (system-
atized), intrusions may not explains these hallucinatory experi-
ences as well. Furthermore, metacognitive beliefs related cognitive
dissonance does not account for AVH with positive content.
Finally, inner speech, intrusive memories and intrusive thoughts
are all experienced in inner space, and, as such, don’t account for
the outer space location of AVH. Of the above models, only mod-
els involving deficits in the inner space-outer space distinction,
the “where” and “what” pathways, and top-down/bottom-up
interaction could explain the outer space location of AVH.
COMBINATORICS: RESOLVING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PUZZLE
Thus far it appears that AVH experiences are associated with
rather complex patterns of commonality and differences across
subjects, and that combinatoric association of AVH phenomeno-
logical variables accounts nicely for the observed phenomenolog-
ical heterogeneity. Taking in considerations that at least some of
the phenomenological variables appear to point to specific deficits
in brain function, and that any given single deficit model does
not adequately account for AVH, it could be concluded that the
diverse AVH phenomenology results from combinatoric associ-
ation of neural deficits. I suggest that AVH experiences require
necessarily activity in Wernicke’s area, which constitute a final
common pathway (Stephane et al., 2000) for a widely distributed
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network that underlies emotions and aspects of cognition such as
language, attention, memory. AVH arise from dysfunction (e.g.,
abnormal laterality or dysconnectivity) at combinations of nodes
in the network that are subject specific, which determine the
phenomenology of AVH in the subject at hand.
Concerning normal and abnormal brain function, combi-
natorics is not a novel idea. A century-old visionary theory
of Korbinian Brodmann suggested that higher brain functions
depend on a set of elementary neural resources combined in tem-
porospatial patterns specific to each function (Brodmann, 1909);
and this view is currently readily accepted in the neuroscience
community (Stephane et al., 2010b). More importantly, emerging
evidence about a small subset of AVH phenomenological vari-
ables supports this approach. For example, Waters and colleagues
have shown that AVH could result from a combined deficits in
intentional inhibition and context memory (Waters et al., 2006).
The first would result in intrusions of memories into conscious-
ness and the second would explain the other-misattribution of
these memories. Additionally, based on imaging findings in our
research group, we previously suggested that combined abnormal
activity ofWernicke’s area and of the SMA results in AVH; the for-
mer would explain the perceptual experience “Hearing” and the
latter the other-misattribution of what is heard (Stephane et al.,
2006b).
To date, the most substantiated combinatoric of deficits is
that between self-other, and inner space-outer space confusions.
Based on the phenomenological structure of AVH (Stephane
et al., 2003), Larøi andWoodward have suggested that AVH could
result from combinatoric abnormalities in inner space-outer
space and self-other distinctions, where either can be present
or absent (Larøi and Woodward, 2007). We have investigated
these capacities in the same subjects and with similar experi-
mental designs and found, as has been previously reported, that
hallucinating schizophrenia patients showed other- and outer
space-misattributions (Stephane et al., 2010a,c). More impor-
tantly, we found that inner space-outer space and self-other
distinction capacities are independent (Stephane et al., in prepa-
ration), which mirrors nicely the different “where” and “what”
pathways for speech processing (Badcock, 2010). Recently, Waters
et al. (2012), presented the most elaborate model yet, which com-
bines multiple deficits/abnormal activity including the auditory
cortex, signal detection, intentional inhibition, and top-down fac-
tors. According to my proposal above, all deficits need not be
present in all subjects. Any given deficit can be present or absent
in any given subject, which makes hallucinating subjects different
from each other as is commonly observed.
Finally, the current proposal is meant as a framework for
resolving the puzzle of AVH and not a resolution for the puzzle
itself. It has two main practical implications for future research.
First, taking in consideration AVH phenomenology (i.e.,
studying subgroups phenomenologically defined) could improve
the signal/noise ratio. If indeed the neural basis of AVH differs in
specific aspects according to AVH subtypes (e.g., inside or outside
the head location of AVH), an experimental design that include
both subtypes in one group would add noise to the signal gen-
erated by the aspect that differentiate the two subtypes. Thus,
this approach could maximize the chance of understanding of
the cognitive and neural basis of AVH. Better understanding of
the cognitive basis could also facilitate treatment efforts for AVH
through cognitive remediation.
Second, the phenomenological subgroups could also inform
the experimental design. Any given AVH characteristic could
provide clues about the malfunctioning cognitive and neural pro-
cesses that resulted in AVH with that particular characteristic.
For example AVH with lexical, sentencial, and discourse linguis-
tic complexity could point to dysfunction in lexical, sentential,
and discourse processes, respectively. Therefore, the appropriate
cognitive task could be designed for the appropriate phenomeno-
logical type.
Finally, the success of phenomenological research depends
in no small measures on the reliable identification of the phe-
nomenological subtypes.
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